A Proskauer London-based team, consisting of partner Paul Tannenbaum and associates Julia Bihary, Shameelah Khan, and Antonia George, were recently successful in a pro bono personal independence payment (“PIP”) appeal case. PIP is a benefit awarded by the Department for Work & Pensions (“DWP”) for people who need help with

Last week, Proskauer prevailed at the U.S. Supreme Court on behalf of our client, Stuart Harrow, in an appeal that determined that the statutory deadlines for appealing administrative decisions are not automatically jurisdictional and do not prevent claims challenging a furlough from being heard in the Federal Circuit. Following a furlough in 2013, Department of Defense employee Stuart Harrow appealed to the Merits Systems Protection Board (MSPB), an independent agency established to adjudicate federal employment disputes, for a hardship exemption. He argued that he was prevented from finding other work due to a discontinuous six-day furlough and, as a result, should receive lost pay. After waiting several years for a decision, during which time the MSPB lost its quorum and temporarily stopped deciding cases, Mr. Harrow’s claim was eventually denied. Even then, it took some time for Mr. Harrow to learn of this decision, as it was sent to a DOD email address that had been deactivated.

Proskauer recently prevailed at the Second Circuit on behalf of our incarcerated pro bono client, James Thomas, in an appeal that determined that Mr. Thomas was not provided adequate notice before the district court entered summary judgment against him. Proceeding pro se, Mr. Thomas brought claims for civil rights violations under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments against prison officials related to multiple searches. Defendants moved for summary judgment and provided Mr. Thomas with a short and plain statement providing an overview of summary judgment procedure. Under the district court’s local rules, however, represented parties moving for summary judgment against pro se litigants must also provide the full text of the applicable rules governing summary judgment procedure to ensure adequate understanding of the complicated nature and serious consequences of the motion. Despite this requirement, the district court excused defendants’ failure to provide documentation of the rules because, in its view, the plain statement they provided sufficiently advised Mr. Thomas of his obligation to submit evidence in opposition to summary judgment. The district court then entered summary judgment against Mr. Thomas, in part because he failed to adduce evidence specifically controverting defendants’ factual assertions, as the rules require.

It was unlike any courtroom I had seen before. The Immigration Judge appeared on a video screen a little blurry but larger than life. My client, an eight-year-old girl, sat next to me at a long table. This proceeding in Dilley, Texas was not open to the public but was held behind two locked doors in a trailer secured within a sprawling “family residential center” that despite its friendly name, had all the indicia of a jail.

This was an expedited removal proceeding, and I was appealing an asylum officer’s negative credible fear determination for my young client. Her mother’s appeal already had been denied so this was our last chance to prevent the two from being deported. Especially considering my client’s age, I wanted to marshal the evidence and explain why the legal standard had been met in this case. “May I be heard Your Honor?” I asked. “No, you may not,” he responded. The Judge asked my client a few questions with little follow-up and denied the appeal, wishing my client, “good luck in your home country.”